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ABSTRACT
Micromobility vehicles are gaining popularity due to their portable
nature, and their ability to serve short distance urban commutes
better than traditional modes of transportation. Most of these vehi-
cles, offered by various micromobility service providers around the
world, are shareable and can be rented (by-the-minute) by riders,
thus eliminating the need of owning and maintaining a personal
vehicle. However, the existing micromobility ecosystem comprising
of vehicles, service providers, and their users, can be exploited as
an attack surface by malicious entities – to compromise its security,
safety and privacy. In this short position paper, we outline potential
privacy and security challenges related to a very popular urban
micromobility platform, specifically, dockless battery-powered e-
scooters.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Human-centered computing→ Ubiquitous and mobile devices;
• Computer systems organization → Embedded and cyber-
physical systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Micromobility has emerged as a popular mode of urban transporta-
tion, and collectively represents the compact, lightweight vehicles
such as electric scooters, electric skateboards, electric bikes, hover-
boards, segways, etc. [16]. Among these vehicles, electric scooters
or e-scooters are the most appealing to urban users [32], mainly due
to the shared or rent-by-the-minute schemes offered by a number
of different service providers. These vehicles are preferred by users
for a plethora of reasons, such as their portable nature which allows
easier bypassing of urban traffic, and their ability to reach desti-
nations that otherwise required walking [30]. While the docked
models can be parked at fixed locations, the dockless models can
be dropped off at a more flexible location. The most noteworthy
aspect is their potential to connect the gray area between tradi-
tional points-of-interests such as parking lots and bus stops, and
final destinations such as workplaces and campus buildings, in
congested areas or places with limited transportation. These con-
venient options also save users from maintenance costs associated
with owning a vehicle, and from rather expensive ride-hailing or
ride-sharing costs for short distance travels. Further, the stream-
lined process of geo-locating nearby scooters through the service
provider’s application, easy payment options, and flexible drop-off
or parking options make micromobility e-scooter services notably
attractive to urban commuters.
The electric scooter adoption has either been a success (coex-
isting with existing modes) or a failure (creating chaos) in urban
communities depending on the readiness of the cities to these un-
conventional transportation means [3, 5, 12, 17]. Shared electric
scooters deployed by the service providers, such as Lime and Bird,
are almost universally equipped with an embedded controller and
can be activated using their corresponding smartphone application
[4, 6, 11, 20]. The scooters communicate with the smartphone ap-
plication using BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) spectrum and/or using
the Internet, both of which are well established and prevalent tech-
nologies. However, use of such communication channels also opens
the door to a plethora of attacks, some of which can be especially
effective on micromobility e-scooters. Similarly, the use of cloud for
managing the e-scooter rental and user data can become a lucrative
target. The literature is already rich with several different attacks
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on micromobility e-scooters, and some of the attack resources are
even readily accessible online. Amateurs without expert knowledge
or grasp of the underlying technology can easily adopt and execute
(with reasonable success) some of these attacks for monetary or
other gains, with only slight modifications of existing tools and
techniques.
While some of the attacks have already been addressed, many
remain unaddressed either due to lack of a suitable solution or due
to lack of awareness. Moreover, while many different attacks are
already published, no prior work systematized the various attack
points within the micromobility ecosystem and the different types
of adversaries. In this paper, we systematize and discuss security
and privacy concerns pertaining to the micromobility e-scooter
services, and attack scenarios plausible with their interfaces. Such a
systematize discussion will help developers and researchers to eas-
ily identify weaknesses, and improve overall security and privacy
properties of the ecosystem. We also discuss potential counter-
measures against some of the attacks, wherever possible. Before
describing the different attacks in Section 3, we first detail the
micromobility e-scooter service ecosystem in Section 2.
2 BACKGROUND
Micromobility e-scooter users can access the shared vehicles via
the smartphone application provided by the service providers. First,
the rider creates a user account and register a payment method
with the service provider. The rider can then skim through a list
of nearby e-scooters through the application, and navigate to the
desired e-scooter. Once in close proximity, the rider scans the QR
code on the e-scooter, initializing the riding process and starting
the e-scooter both contingent on the funds (credits) and charge
remaining on the e-scooter battery. The service providers charge
from 15 to 30 cents per minute to ride the e-scooter along with
a base activation fee. Certain e-scooter models can travel up to
a distance of 28 miles in a single charge, which is much shorter
than the average distance covered in e-scooter trips [28]. The e-
scooters can cover up to 18.6 miles per hour in a typical ride based
on the road conditions and other vehicle traffic, and are equipped
with headlights, tail or brake lights, a bell or horn and sometimes a
display. While some models have throttle and front brakes located
on the handle bar similar to a motorcycle, other models have foot
controlled brakes or rear disk brakes or anti-lock brakes for a safer
ride [4, 6, 11, 13, 14, 20].
E-scooters primarily rely on BLE, which broadcasts packets at
fixed intervals that can be captured by smartphones. These packets
contain unique identifiers which helps in identifying the e-scooters
from other BLE devices. To start or stop most e-scooters, the operat-
ing smartphone needs to have both Bluetooth enabled and Internet
data available. This can be easily tested by toggling both the options
on and off and checking if the e-scooter can be started or stopped
with only one of the features. Overall, the important entities that
are part of the micromobility infrastructure are the rider, the smart-
phone used by the rider to communicate with the e-scooter, the
offline (BLE) and online (cloud) communication medium used by
the service providers, and the e-scooter itself. The attacker or ad-
versary, active or passive, in a micromobility ecosystem can be a
rider, an outsider or the service provider as shown in Figure 1.
E-Scooter
Rider’s 
Phone
Service 
Provider Cloud
Bluetooth
Figure 1: E-scooter ecosystem and attack points.
A rider canmanipulate the e-scooter and the service provider for
personal benefits by exploiting vulnerabilities in the smartphone
application and the communication channels. An outsider can
be any third party entity with harmful (or deceptive) intentions
towards the rider or the service provider or an entity who may
be curious about the micromobility ecosystem or the rider. The
outsider can attack the e-scooter, the rider, the communication
channel or the service provider. The service provider can obtain
information about the micromobility users and their surroundings
in addition to e-scooter operations. As a result, the service provider
may constantly monitor user habits and preferences and share
sensitive information with third parties to maximize revenue. These
entities cause various hazardous scenarios and privacy concerns
that affect the micromobility e-scooter ecosystem intentionally
or unintentionally. A comprehensive set of security and privacy
concerns are systematically described next.
3 POTENTIAL ATTACKS
3.1 Physical Damage
3.1.1 Observations. The key components in the e-scooters are
its battery, engine, brakes, headlight, controller chip and other
mechanical, electrical and electronic components to ensure safe
and smooth driving experience for the rider. Some e-scooters also
have anti-theft mechanisms in place such as physical locks that can
be enabled and disabled from the rider’s smartphone through BLE.
Theymay also have alarm systems that emit loud sounds or frequent
beeps in the event they are displaced without unlocking them. Any
of these components can be the target of an attacker (a rider or an
outsider) and often times the e-scooter itself. For instance, e-scooter
brake wires and batteries were targeted in several physical attacks
[7]. E-scooters were also stolen and possibly used as a personal
e-scooter by flashing custom firmware on the e-scooter controller
[9, 10, 18].
3.1.2 Consequences. The attacker (the rider or outsider) can tar-
get the e-scooter battery, specifically drain it before attempting to
move or acquire it, in order to circumvent the security mechanisms.
Once the e-scooter is acquired, the attacker can install malicious
modules, remove or replace key components before placing it back
in the streets to control the e-scooter remotely or to covertly gather
data about the e-scooter and populace near the e-scooter. These
tampered e-scooters can be a threat to road users in many ways.
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The attacker can intentionally injure the victim rider by remotely
manipulating or interfering on the with the e-scooter’s brakes, dam-
aging the tires or other physical damage that could incapacitate the
e-scooter. The attacker can indirectly target a group of non-riders
or other vehicles on road by strategically targeting a rider in their
path. Such attacks cause monetary loss for the service providers,
environmental pollution (when burned by vandalists), and physical
damage to road users. The attacker, with financial interests, can sell
the untraceable (removing key identifiers) or modified (malware)
e-scooters online, which can later be converted for personal use
[9].
3.1.3 Countermeasures. The service providers could assign the
e-scooter chargers (users tasked with charging the e-scooters for a
small payment) an additional task of checking the vital functionali-
ties of the e-scooters such as brakes and tires before redeploying
them after charging. Further, the non-riders and other road users
who come across any issues in the e-scooter could have an option
to report them allowing the service provider to take it out of service
in order, thus preventing any other user from riding it.
3.2 Eavesdropping
3.2.1 Observations. The e-scooters communicate with the rider
smartphone over the BLE channel, and in some cases over the
Internet. Entities can listen to data exchanges between the e-scooter
and rider smartphone over these channels with suitable hardware
(Ubertooth) or software (Wireshark).
3.2.2 Consequences. The ability to successfully sniff control com-
mands and service requests can give leverage to the attacker, active
or passive, to study the micromobility e-scooter ecosystem when
combined with fuzzing (Section 3.6) and to explore a world of
exploitations described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. For instance, re-
searchers in [21] identified Bird’s API endpoints that contained the
QR code information used to reserve e-scooters and make them
chirp without being in physical proximity to the e-scooter. Also,
the leakage of the e-scooter lock information from the API shows a
possibility of attackers stealing them without draining e-scooter
batteries.
3.2.3 Countermeasures. Though it is difficult to deter attackers
from sniffing data, the service provider could design the applications
and services to prevent sensitive information leakages by disabling
or making such features inaccessible to unauthorized entities.
3.3 Man-in-the-Middle and Replay Attacks
3.3.1 Observations. With sufficient knowledge obtained from the
eavesdropping attack, the attacker can intervene (modify com-
mands or drop data) communication between a rider smartphone
and an e-scooter. BLE vulnerabilities have allowed researchers to
perform MITM attacks on the Xiaomi M365 e-scooter [1, 15, 22].
3.3.2 Consequences. The ability to successfully replay or mimic a
rider opens up the possibilities of attacks described in Sections 3.4
and 3.6. The attacker can jam the communication medium by bom-
barding with multiple legit or malformed requests (replay) in a short
time period for a Denial of Service or Fuzzing attack, ultimately
exhausting e-scooter battery. The attacker (with malicious intent
towards the rider) can control the e-scooter by injecting commands
remotely, and intentionally cause physical harm to the rider and
other road users alike.
3.3.3 Countermeasures. The attacks can be mitigated by observing
the the behavior of the nodes and the nature of their packet re-
quests and blacklisting suspicious nodes [23, 26]. Furthermore, the
service providers and micromobility users should consider keeping
their services and smartphones updated to patch up any security
vulnerabilities.
3.4 Denial-of-Service
3.4.1 Observations. This type of attacks has the ability to disrupt
any service such as locking and unlocking the e-scooter, etc. (often
rendering them inaccessible) and can be targeted towards the e-
scooter exhausting its resources, or towards the service providers
affecting their quality of service.
3.4.2 Consequences. Combined with the findings from Section 3.2,
the attacker can implement the attack in a massive scale, plausibly
pavingway for a DDoS attack. For instance, the attacker could target
a particular service provider and intentionally cause monetary
loss for the service provider by preventing riders from using their
services in a targeted area through a worm hole or black hole
infiltration of modified e-scooters.
3.4.3 Countermeasures. The service provider could systematically
monitor and filter real time traffic, maintain logs and implement
disaster recovery plans for quick recovery in the event of an attack
[34, 36].
3.5 Spoofing
3.5.1 Observations. The micromobility applications track the lo-
cation of the e-scooter using the inbuilt GNSS module on board
the e-scooter or using the riders smartphone or both. An attacker,
the rider or the outsider, can target either options to manipulate
this location. In the first approach, the rider can install any location
spoofing applications (available on the Internet) on the smartphone
to fake their location [2, 8, 37]. After installation, the rider can easily
trick the micromobility application and the service provider. In the
second approach, the attacker can manipulate or replay GPS signal
using SDR hardware (HackRF, USRP, BladeRF, etc.) which can pro-
duce and broadcast forged GPS signals to the victim receiver. It is
also possible for an attacker to capture a GPS signal from a different
location and rebroadcast it to the victim receiver (replay attack)
[35]. The latter approaches can trick both the GNSS modules on the
smartphone (solely reliant on GPS for location) and the e-scooter.
3.5.2 Consequences. A successful location attack gives the attacker
the ability to manipulate the application and navigate the victim
who depends on GPS navigation into dangerous situations or lo-
cations. For instance, the attacker (with malicious intent towards
the victim) can strategically select and spoof the location of an
e-scooter(s) to a secluded area or an area with minimal human pres-
ence to entice victim riders. The attacker (with intent of financial
gain) can follow a similar approach to spoof the e-scooters to a
randomized location (or physically hide it plain sight) making it dif-
ficult for riders (and e-scooter chargers alike) to find them, leading
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Table 1: User data collected, according to the privacy policies of various micromobility service providers.
Service Provider User Provided Automatically Collected From 3rd Party Sources
Contact Info Billing Info Identification Info Demographic Info Device Info Location and Vehicle Info Analytics User interactions related to the service provider
Bird ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Lime ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Razor ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Lyft ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Jump ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
to financial loss for the service provider. Indirectly, this approach
eventually leads to a drained and/or probably stolen e-scooter, and
increases the bounty for finding that e-scooter, thus making it a
profitable venture for the attacker (e-scooter charger). The attacker
(rider) may be able to park in restricted areas or no parking zones,
thereby causing public nuisance.
3.5.3 Countermeasures. To prevent location spoofing, the GNSS
modules should not solely rely on GPS but use additional sources
for location and to detect spoofing [29, 31, 33].
3.6 Fuzzing
3.6.1 Observations. The fuzzing technique is different from the
attack in Section 3.4 where the victim (e-scooter or rider) is over-
whelmed with continuous bursts of data rendering them incapable
of using the e-scooter. This attack gives the attacker the ability to
gauge how each service provider ecosystem handles the e-scooters
from the responses, from the API and other control systems, ob-
tained after testing with request or command variants with the
intent to identify bugs or vulnerabilities (not found through passive
eavesdropping).
3.6.2 Consequences. The attacker (the rider or the outsider) can
infer the protocols used, authentication information (e.g. e-scooter
password) and service request-responses by the application by
passively eavesdropping or sniffing traffic and actively testing the
system, andmay be able intercept, manipulate or replay the requests.
While the attacker can identify (publicly available) nodes leaking
sensitive information, the attacker can also check if the application
may be using extraneous permissions that can covertly be exploited
to collect information.
3.6.3 Countermeasures. The fuzzing attacks can be controlled by
preventing eavesdropping and MITM attacks (Sections 3.2 and 3.3).
3.7 User Data Sharing and Inference
3.7.1 Observations. User data in this micromobility platform can
range from any smartphone related activity to a history of loca-
tions the rider has visited for any period of time. The micromobility
services transfer the data gathered by the applications on the user
smartphone over the Internet. Table 1 lists the user data collected
by these applications as mentioned in their privacy policies. While
some applications do not respond to Do Not Track requests [13],
most usually share aggregate data with third parties such as Face-
book, Google and require location access (Always setting) from
users during usage and in background, and therefore the service
providers have access to sensitive information (user whereabouts):
frequent start and destination places of the riders, a history of loca-
tions visited by rider, and possibly their abode. Other data categories
and issues are yet to be explored, as they vary from application to
application, however the threat that these micromobility services
could share private data of users (riders and non-riders) to multiple
stakeholders still looms, as which data and what format (raw or
processed) these service providers provide them is unknown.
3.7.2 Consequences. Unregulated and non-anonymized data shar-
ing can be used to create a user profile that can later compromise
user safety [19, 27]. The entity can mine the data obtained from
either the service provider or through eavesdropping to infer more
information about the micromobility service users and neighbor-
ing people. For instance, the attacker (application with intent of
financial gain) can discover neighboring users in vicinity via BLE,
users in the house via WiFi devices, and use other phone activity
usage information to know more about the rider (and user) and
his surroundings. The attacker (other stakeholders) can use the
information to learn about the users and then strategically place
e-scooters on road, entice riders with suitable social media adver-
tisements, etc. The attacker, an outsider with malicious intent, may
also be able to gauge the victim’s schedule with the location history
and be able to identify rider preferences, frequency of visits, and use
the information for personal vendetta and financial gain, spreading
the information to other malicious entities, who could track the
user down in person effectively be a physical threat to the users.
3.7.3 Countermeasures. Privacy compliance defines how a com-
pany conforms to privacy laws, policies, guidelines in different
countries or regions when managing confidential personal data
[25]. An extensive analysis, with existing approaches and tech-
niques such as inferring traffic flows of the applications [24, 38], is
required to check if micromobility services have any information
leakages and adhere to what they promise to collect or do with the
collected sensitive user data.
4 CONCLUSION
After describing the various components in the micromobility e-
scooter ecosystem, we systematically summarized critical security
and privacy concerns in the ecosystem, which both the micromo-
bility users and service providers should be aware of. This first-of-
its-kind systematized discussion shall be helpful to developers and
researchers for identifying new weaknesses, and improving over-
all security and privacy properties of the micromobility e-scooter
ecosystem. Given the constant evolution and changes in the applica-
tions and services, we intend to extensively analyze the ecosystem
again in the future.
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